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German Foreign Policy toward the 
Visegrad Countries
Patterns of Integration in Central Europe
by Andrea Gawrich and Maxim Stepanov
Summary
Relations between Germany and the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovakia) have undergone numerous changes since the fall of  
the Iron Curtain. For each country in the V4, the relationship with Germany has 
developed along different paths. Today, differences in outlook seem to be present 
on issues ranging from EU energy security to NATO’s role in European security 
(on the eastern borders in particular). The recent Ukraine crisis is another instance 
of  diverging attitudes. This twofold analysis describes, firstly, Germany’s coopera-
tion with the V4 as a whole, particularly its decisive role in shaping the countries’ 
EU and NATO accession processes. Secondly, it investigates the bilateral agree-
ments between Germany and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 
respectively, and examines these as instruments of  German foreign policy. Our 
conclusion is that, because of  unequal interests and differences of  opinions, the 
V4 as a whole is less important to Germany than the sum of  its individual bilateral 
relationships.
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German Foreign Policy toward the Visegrad 
Countries
Patterns of Integration in Central Europe
by Andrea Gawrich and Maxim Stepanov
Introduction
Since the fall of  the Iron Curtain, relations between 
Germany and the Visegrad Four (V4) – the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – have 
changed in numerous ways. Recently, in light of  
the Euromaidan movement in Ukraine, the Rus-
sian annexation of  the Crimean peninsula, the EU 
decision to set up sanctions against Russia, and 
new energy security plans, Germany’s relations 
with Poland in particular (but also with the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) have become much closer. 
This has had a significant impact on the issue of  
EU energy security as well as on the role of  the 
NATO in European security and on securing 
NATO’s eastern borders.
Within the European Union, the Federal Republic 
of  Germany has long been the most vocal advo-
cate for a united Europe. Based on its geographic 
proximity to the former Eastern bloc and its sense 
of  historical responsibility, Germany early on 
expressed its support for expanding the EU into 
Eastern Europe and favored EU reform processes 
that would enable the eastern enlargement of  the 
Community in 2004. Likewise, Germany saw the 
expansion and increased importance of  the EU as 
supporting factors for its European policy.1
This analysis starts with a retrospective overview of  
V4 accession to the EU and NATO and Germany’s 
role in this process. It then moves on to examine 
perspectives for further cooperation between Ger-
many and the V4 within the enlarged EU. Finally, 
it offers tentative conclusions regarding possible 
future cooperation between Germany and the V4 
within the EU.
1. Retrospective Overview
1.1 Historical Legacies, Constraints, and 
Responsibilities
German foreign policy toward partner countries 
in Eastern Europe and, in particular, Germany’s 
advocacy of  the EU’s eastern enlargement, have 
been justified on the basis of  two general para-
digms. The first paradigm is Germany’s sense of  
historical responsibility, which should be read as a 
constructivist approach to European norms based 
on responsibility for a shared and peaceful Europe. 
The second has been a more rationalist pursuit of  
political stability in and economic interconnected-
ness with Eastern Europe.2
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Nonetheless, Germany’s relationships with the 
Visegrad states have developed along different 
paths. Particularly in the cases of  Poland and 
the Czech Republic, the intensified relationships 
between the V4 and Germany have been marked 
by the burden of  Germany’s historical legacy, dur-
ing and beyond the EU accession process. In the 
early 1990s, Germany’s relations with Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland were shaped to a great 
extent by bilateral agreements on neighborly coop-
eration. Accordingly, German foreign policy relat-
ing to the Visegrad states began by seeking a gate-
way to bilateralism. Bilateral agreements are rarely 
applied as instruments of  German foreign policy. 
Thus Germany built formalized bilateral founda-
tions with the V4 before subsuming this foreign 
policy within the larger European project.
The relationship between Germany and Poland has 
been highly dynamic over the past decade. After 
a degree of  constant progress and even bilateral 
euphoria, the relationship worsened at the begin-
ning of  the new millennium after interest groups 
of  Germans who had been expelled after World 
War II initiated a museum commemorating their 
expulsion and even started debates on restitutions 
again. This led to considerable tensions, especially 
after a 2004 resolution by the Sejm (the lower 
house of  parliament) called upon the Polish gov-
ernment to initiate negotiations with Germany 
on war reparations. Even though this resolution 
did not ultimately have practical repercussions, it 
reopened historical wounds and placed a bilateral 
strain on the relationship. On the heels of  the V4’s 
EU accession, relations suffered a further setback 
starting in 2005. This was triggered by the Baltic 
Sea gas pipeline project, spearheaded by German 
chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Russian presi-
dent Vladimir Putin.3 However, when Donald Tusk 
became Polish prime minister in 2007, ties between 
Germany and Poland tightened once again. The 
closeness of  the German-Polish working relation-
ship within the Weimar Triangle was proven dur-
ing the Ukraine crisis, beginning in the winter of  
2013–14.
Despite substantial rapprochement with the Czech 
Republic, German-Czech tension arose in the 
1990s due to expelled ethnic Germans demanding 
compensation for assets that had been seized by 
the Czech Republic, while Czech victims of  the 
Nazis in turn demanded compensation for their 
own losses. On top of  that, an intense debate arose 
over the legal validity of  the Beneš decrees, which 
had formed the legal foundation for the expul-
sion of  ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia after 
World War II. In 1997, after gradual rapproche-
ment, the nations signed a German-Czech Declara-
tion on Mutual Relations and their Future Develop-
ment, establishing the German-Czech Future Fund, 
in large part to compensate Czech victims of  the 
Nazis.
The focal point of  Germany’s relationship with 
Slovakia in the 1990s was not so much historical 
issues as the question of  how best to approach 
Vladimir Mečiar’s authoritarian regime. Likewise, 
Germany’s relationship with Hungary was not cen-
tered on historical legacies but was instead shaped 
in particular by German gratitude for the opening 
of  Hungary’s borders in 1989. Moreover, the Ger-
man minority in Hungary did not pose an issue in 
bilateral relations.4 Nor has Germany been a lead-
ing critic of  the recent democratic “backsliding” in 
the country.5
1.2 Germany and the EU’s Eastern 
Enlargement
In the context of  the EU’s major eastern enlarge-
ment in 2004, Germany faced three fundamental 
issues that would determine the broad strokes of  
its European policy: widening versus deepening; 
net payments into the EU treasury versus financ-
ing integration; and finally, multilateralism versus 
self-interest. What made it possible to resolve this 
complexity was that Germany’s contribution to 
the eastern enlargement was supported by general 
pan-European consensus, along with a bold desire 
on the part of  the Visegrad countries to integrate 
into Western political and security structures and 
to undergo the reform processes such integration 
would require.6
The EU offered the Central European countries 
strong incentives. These began with the signing of  
the first cooperation agreements shortly after the 
end of  the Cold War.7 The agreements were signifi-
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cantly bolstered by the prospects of  accession. At 
the same time, the EU stipulated that the countries 
adopt the common legal framework, the aquis com-
munautaire, which was evaluated as a second transi-
tion of  these countries.
During the EU enlargement, German foreign 
policy had two complex objectives: deepening inte-
gration within the EU and enlarging the EU itself. 
These two objectives needed to be reconciled in 
the multilateral context without being conditionally 
linked. After all, the EU-15 included states (such as 
France) that were interested in deepening integra-
tion but did not necessarily favor eastern enlarge-
ment, as well as states (such as the UK) that had 
the opposite preference and strongly advocated 
eastern expansion while distancing themselves 
from further integration.
In Germany, too, contradictory interests needed 
to be resolved in order to keep controversial 
issues from delaying the accession negotiations. 
The aforementioned discussions surrounding 
the Beneš decrees played an undeniable role in 
German domestic politics during the late acces-
sion phase. (The Beneš decrees provided a legal 
basis for the expulsion of  the German popula-
tion from the Sudetenland; ratified in 1946, they 
were and remain part of  Czech law and continue 
to be a subject fervid social debate.8) Edmund 
Stoiber, then longstanding minister-president 
of  Bavaria as well as chairman of  the Christian 
Social Union (CSU), called for their annulment 
in 2002.9 In doing so, he became a spokesman 
for those Germans who had been forced to leave 
areas that had been part of  Germany until World 
War II. If  the repeal of  the Beneš decrees had 
been required by Germany as part of  the pack-
age deal in exchange for EU accession, it would 
have been fatal to the entire project of  eastern 
enlargement, not least because the population 
in Poland also feared that “the vertriebene” (Ger-
man expellees) would petition for the return of  
their former property, especially in those parts 
of  Poland bordering Germany. This served as a 
primary cause of  skepticism in Poland regarding 
EU accession.10
In the German Bundestag from 1990 on, almost 
every party present supported the EU’s eastward 
expansion. The notable exception was the CSU in 
Bavaria. Although it did not reject eastern enlarge-
ment outright, the CSU stressed the need to take 
special care in evaluating EU applicants’ readiness 
for accession. Generally, however, German political 
parties as well as the federal states actively cooper-
ated to shape Germany’s European policy regard-
ing eastern enlargement. For instance, some federal 
states helped to develop “twinning” projects – ini-
tiatives intended to strengthen the capacities of  
candidate states’ bureaucracies.
Although the German federal states campaigned 
for EU accession of  the countries of  Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) – as shown by a German 
Länder Decision as early as February 199311 – east-
ern enlargement entailed obvious resource conflicts 
between the structurally weak regions of  the for-
mer East Germany and the candidate states. For 
example, the federal states of  the former East Ger-
many were increasingly in competition with CEE 
countries over EU cohesion funding. This resulted 
in disputes with the EU Commission during nego-
tiation of  the EU financial framework. Saxony, for 
instance, filed a lawsuit against the EU Commis-
sion over a canceled subsidy package. Basically, the 
German government took a hardline position on 
financial aspects of  the enlargement, but supported 
Poland’s goal concerning EU funding.12
1.3 German Attitudes toward EU Integration 
of the Visegrad Four
As early as the 1990 European Summit in Dublin, 
intentions were expressed to negotiate treaties of  
association with all CEE countries. Only three 
years later, at the 1993 summit in Copenhagen, did 
EU member states reach the general consensus 
that integrating the CEE states into the European 
Community would be in keeping with its guiding 
principle of  a peaceful and prosperous Europe.
Once the first accession negotiations with the Cen-
tral European countries were underway, the major-
ity of  the German public supported a near-term 
eastern enlargement, sharing the view that acces-
sion was in Germany’s strategic interest. During the 
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preparatory process that began in 1998, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party 
government led by Gerhard Schröder and Joschka 
Fischer was guided by domestic pragmatism. It 
was necessary to strike a balance between numer-
ous interests in the various stages of  accession 
negotiations.
Although consensus over eastern enlargement had 
been reached in the early 1990s, there were none-
theless contentious debates in German society 
regarding the process. In the first half  of  the 1990s, 
German approval for the process was compara-
tively high. Poles responded to this positive attitude 
with relief  and, accordingly, perceived Germany 
as an advocate of  Polish interests in the EU.13 Yet 
after accession in 2004, public opinion took what 
at first seems to be a paradoxical turn. Sentiment 
became less pro-European. Peter Becker describes 
it thus:
The overall consensus on European policy that had been 
shared by all parties, associations, and interest groups – 
along with the vast majority of  Germans – had subsided 
and given way to a circumspect or even skeptical attitude 
toward the European integration process. The permissive 
consensus eroded and was replaced with a matter-of-
factness that was guided by self-interest and generally more 
skeptical. Germans’ general attitude toward Europe trans-
formed from “staunchly pro-European” to “dispassionate 
support,” “indifference,” or even “disenchantment.”14
The rising discomfort in Germany came from fears 
of  unbridled migration, a fear stoked by specific 
interest groups. The German government felt com-
pelled to respond, for example with transitional 
regulations negotiated by the Schröder government 
regarding the freedom of  movement for workers.
Overall, German attitudes were shaped less by 
a perception of  the V4 as a group than by per-
ception of  each of  the four countries individu-
ally. Hungarian accession had the highest rate of  
approval in Germany, followed closely by the 
Czech Republic. Poland and Slovakia had signifi-
cantly lower ratings. The overall trend was a decline 
in public approval. From 2002 to 2004, 10 to 15 
percent of  those Germans who had originally said 
they were undecided switched to opposing eastern 
enlargement.15 Alongside the various disputes over 
the bilateral legacies of  World War II (especially the 
tension with the Czech Republic over the Beneš 
decrees and the similar controversy with Poland 
over German expellees), the shared borders with 
Poland and the Czech Republic had a negative 
impact on public sentiment in the run-up to acces-
sion. Meanwhile, relations with Hungary – com-
paratively less affected by history – also benefited 
from the lack of  a common border.
In general, the German approval rating of  the EU 
enlargement was observably below the European 
average. As early as 1991, the Eurobarometer sur-
vey polled residents’ visions of  the future “architec-
ture of  Europe.” Some 55 percent of  respondents 
(from the EC-12 plus former East Germany) 
believed that certain countries from CEE such as 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia would be 
members of  the European Community by the year 
2000. Only 50 percent of  West Germans shared 
this view, compared with 67 percent of  East Ger-
mans. Opposition to accession was 28 percent on 
average across the EC-12+, whereas the views of  
West Germans in particular were even more skepti-
cal. (Some 36 percent responded that those Eastern 
European countries would not be members of  the 
European Community in the year 2000.16)
In the years 1998 and 2000, German approval 
ratings of  EU enlargement was 36 percent, far 
below the average EU-15 rating of  44 percent.17 In 
1998 Germans were thus about as skeptical as the 
French (35 percent approval of  EU enlargement), 
Austrians (33 percent), and Belgians (32 percent).18 
By 2000 Germans surveyed opposed European 
enlargement by 43 percent.19
In the EU-15, however, the Visegrad states were 
preferred to other Eastern European countries. In 
1998 approval ratings for the accession of  Hun-
gary (52 percent), Poland (49 percent), the Czech 
Republic (48 percent), and Slovakia (43 percent) 
were higher than those for Bulgaria (42 percent), 
the Baltic States (41 percent each), and Slovenia 
and Romania (both 39 percent).20 Only two years 
later, these approval ratings had all sunk, whereby 
relationally they remained the same.
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In an opinion poll conducted by the European 
Commission in 2004, the results concerning the 
approval of  the accession of  the ten new member 
states showed that the approval ratings in Germany 
sank even further, reaching the lowest level in the 
EU-15. Only 28 percent of  German surveyed sup-
ported European enlargement, with 56 percent 
against it.21
Public attitudes in Germany toward the eastern 
enlargement of  the EU have been marked by 
skepticism. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Ger-
many’s approval of  eastern enlargement was consis-
tently below that of  the European community  
as a whole.
1.4 Germany and NATO Enlargement
The second path toward integration into the West 
was the accession of  the CEE countries into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
These countries had a desire for collective security 
stemming from the Soviet Union’s former political 
dominance and military interventions, historical 
factors that had long formed an important part of  
national identity. Since both international organi-
zations – the European Community and NATO 
– were established in the same postwar political 
context, integration into the EU and into NATO 
were logically considered together. Membership in 
both organizations was therefore a goal of  many 
Eastern European politicians and was part of  the 
EU-15 negotiations. Consequently, both accession 
procedures took place at the same time. However, 
the adaption pressure of  NATO was not as com-
prehensive as for the EU.
Most of  the German government’s reasons for 
pushing NATO’s eastern enlargement were strate-
gic. For one thing, Germany would thus geographi-
cally move from the eastern border to the center 
of  Europe, providing it with increased security. 
Secondly, as a direct neighbor of  CEE countires, 
Germany had a great interest in their economic and 
political stability. Lastly, economic upswing in the 
CEE countries would most certainly benefit Ger-
many as a trade partner.22
Developments in the CEE countries also posed 
new challenges to NATO and redefined its tasks. 
The political scientist Gunter Hellmann predicted 
that NATO would remain a “community of  val-
ues” for Germany long after the end of  the Cold 
War and that it would increase in importance as a 
political organization, since it could play a central 
role for European security after the dissolution of  
the Warsaw Pact. Germany therefore supported 
NATO’s new strategic concept in 1991, in parti-
cular the goal of  strengthening NATO’s political 
functions.23
Already at the 1990 NATO summit, Helmut Kohl’s 
government had spoken out in favor of  establish-
ing diplomatic relations with the Warsaw Pact 
countries. Subsequently, Germany and the US 
initiated the establishment of  the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace 
Program. Germany also endorsed NATO enlarge-
ment at the December 1993 meeting of  the NATO 
council.24 In 1994, an agreement on military and 
security questions was reached between NATO 
and the Visegrad countries, amounting to a prelude 
to accession. In 1997, NATO began accession 
negotiations with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, which concluded in 1999.25
The steps taken by the German government to 
reach this end clearly show that Germany wel-
comed the institutional integration of  the former 
Warsaw Pact states into NATO. With the accession 
of  Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 
1999, the goal was largely reached. NATO’s sec-
ond eastern enlargement took place in 2004, when 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania 
joined, along the fourth Visegrad country: Slovakia. 
This marked the end of  Slovakia’s political isolation, 
which had been characterized by Vladimir Mečiar’s 
rather autocratic regime between 1992 and 1998.26
In the early 1990s fundamental fears were in fact 
voiced in Germany regarding NATO’s eastern 
enlargement. Public discourse centered on three 
aspects in particular. First, Russia might feel threat-
ened by eastern enlargement; second, strengthening 
NATO could prevent Europe’s emancipation from 
the US; and third, political commentators in par-
ticular championed strengthening the OSCE and, 
DGAPanalyse 17 | September 2014
8
accordingly, demilitarizing Europe. In contrast to 
the expressed preference of  the German foreign 
ministry, however, the German minister of  defense 
at the time, Volker Rühe, favored strengthening 
NATO.27
2. Perspectives
2.1 Germany and the Visegrad Four as EU 
Members: Areas of Cooperation and (Lack 
of) Coordination
Ten years after eastern enlargement, Germany’s 
central European neighbors all have equally close 
economic relationships with Germany, but their 
political views and strategies regarding the EU 
and overall cooperation diverge greatly. Neither 
the Visegrad countries as a group nor the political 
elites in each country had a sound agenda for what 
would come after accession in 2004. At least the 
EU as a whole and Germany in particular had an 
overall goal, namely to provide an improved legal 
basis for the larger EU by putting the Treaty of  
Lisbon into effect. However, there was little agree-
ment and much less clarity on the future of  the 
EU after 2004. It was not even possible to identify 
a common vision. Some spoke of  a “two-speed 
Europe,” others of  “Europe à la carte.” A lack of  
vision among German politicians was the object of  
particular criticism.28
Having achieved EU membership, the V4 countries 
justifiably expected that the paternalism of  the 
EU-15 would come to an end. But this expectation 
was not met, due to the concerns of  German and 
Austrian politicians.29 These, responding to their 
constituencies, feared that the free movement of  
labor and open borders would lead to a high num-
ber of  migrants, competitive disadvantages, and a 
substantial loss of  jobs held by German and Aus-
trian citizens. As a result of  these discussions, each 
member state was allowed to establish transitional 
regulations limiting the free movement of  labor 
until May 2011, when freedom of  mobility came 
into full legal effect. This political decision severely 
undermined the self-confidence of  the CEE coun-
tries. The term “second-class member” was coined. 
Indeed, the skepticism about the European project 
that has been observed in the CEE countries over 
the past ten years stands in clear contrast to the 
single-minded focus on integration into the EU 
that was palpable in the years before accession.
Relations between the V4 and Germany became far 
more complex after EU enlargement. On the one 
hand, Germany handed over its position as media-
tor between Eastern and Western countries to the 
V4 member countries. On the other hand, the evi-
dent and ongoing transatlantic orientation of  the 
V4 remained puzzling to the Germans, not only 
with regard to security issues. The economic cri-
sis, which started four years after EU enlargement, 
turned Germany into a leading actor in the deepen-
ing of  eurozone commitments and in overall eco-
nomic cooperation in the EU. It should be recalled 
that Slovakia is the only V4 country currently in 
the eurozone. For its part, Poland is pursuing entry 
into the eurozone, but the Czech Republic and 
Hungary are not. This means that German leader-
ship affects the V4 countries to various degrees.
2.2 Economic Cooperation between 
Germany and the Visegrad Countries
Immediately after the fall of  the Iron Curtain, Ger-
many saw the promise of  economic cooperation 
with CEE countries. Potentially low production 
and labor costs and the presence of  skilled workers 
were seen as a plus. From an economic point of  
view, increased trade between Germany and the V4 
countries already before 2004 made EU enlarge-
ment a logical next step of  European integration, 
since Germany’s economic model depends on 
exports. At the same time, it was expected that the 
central European countries would in turn benefit 
from increased international trade and German 
direct investments. However, it was expected that 
to ensure economic stability and prosperity, further 
economic instruments would be needed in the V4 
countries in the long term.
2.2.1 Trade relations in the 1990s
Germany became a central trade partner for the 
CEE countries in the 1990s, and trade relations 
soon soared. For example, German exports to 
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Czechoslovakia rose by 166 percent between 
1989 and 1992, and imports rose by 173 percent. 
Between 1993 and 1995, German trade with the 
CEE states increased 30 percent.30 Obviously, at an 
initial point, political integration was not required 
to stimulate trade relations between Germany and 
its eastern neighbors.
The economic conditions in Germany and the V4 
were well suited to the exchange of  goods. This 
was especially true for mechanical engineering, an 
area in which production of  parts was shifted to 
East Central Europe early on. Germany in turn 
exported products in the areas of  mechanical, elec-
trical, and automotive and transport engineering. 
This went hand in hand with a high level of  invest-
ments undertaken by German companies, which 
invested up to 40 percent in joint ventures that in 
turn were supported by state investment support 
schemes. In Czechoslovakia, as an example, the 
percentage of  foreign direct investments was as 
high as 86 percent in 1990.31
2.2.2 Trade relations after European enlargement
After the V4 countries’ accession to the EU, eco-
nomic relations between Germany and the V4 
countries remained grossly asymmetrical, mostly 
due to the size of  Germany’s economy in com-
parison to those of  the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia. Currently, up to 30 percent 
of  the V4 countries’ external trade is with Ger-
many, making Germany their top trade partner by 
far. In 2012, 25 percent of  Poland’s external trade 
(both imports and exports) was with Germany; 
for the Czech Republic it was 30 percent; 20 per-
cent for Slovakia; and 25 percent for Hungary.32 
Commodity flows between Germany and the 
CEE countries have risen considerably since they 
joined the EU in 2004. Data from the German 
office of  federal statistics show that the external 
trade volume with Poland has more than doubled 
since 2004, from 34.7 billion euros to 75.7 billion 
euros. Commodities worth 64.7 billion euros were 
exchanged with the Czech Republic in 2012, as 
opposed to 34.8 billion euros in 2004. The increase 
in trading volume was not quite so dramatic for 
Hungary or Slovakia. However, since Germany 
began to build intensive economic relations with 
the CEE countries in 1990, European enlargement 
did not lead to substantial changes but rather to 
the continuation and deepening of  pre-existing 
relations.
Despite their relatively small economies (with the 
exception of  Poland), the V4 countries have been 
able to place high in the rankings of  countries 
importing to Germany. Poland is in eleventh place 
(with imports valuing 35.9 billion euros) and the 
Czech Republic is twelfth on the list (33 billion 
euros). Imports from Hungary rank sixteenth (19.5 
billion euros), while Slovakia is in eighteenth place 
(12.2 billion euros). This places the Visegrad coun-
tries in the company of  countries such as Spain 
(number 13 on the list), Norway (14), Japan (15), 
and Sweden (17).
The Visegrad countries are similarly important to 
Germany in terms of  exports. In 2013, Poland was 
eighth on the list of  countries to which Germany 
exports (42.4 billion euros), the Czech Republic 
was thirteenth (31 billion euros), Hungary sixteenth 
(17.5 billion euros), and Slovakia was number 21 on 
the list (10.7 billion euros).33
In contrast, foreign direct investments are not sym-
metrical. Germany is by far the most important 
investor in each of  the V4 countries, while CEE 
investments in Germany have a much lower vol-
ume. The table below demonstrates this.34
Figure 1: Direct Investments Germany–V4
German Direct 
Investments 
(Million Euros)
Direct Invest-
ments in 
Germany
Poland 21.533 498
Czech Republic 24.099 258
Hungary 17.382 73
Slovakia 8.766 n.a.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011
German foreign investments in the Visegrad coun-
tries have continually risen since 1990, even if  this 
development has not been quite as consistent as 
in external trade, particularly when the individual 
countries are considered separately. But fluctua-
tions can be explained by the fact that direct invest-
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ments often take place in large projects. In the 
past decade there has been a rise in German direct 
investments, connected to the V4’s EU accession.
During their first ten years in the EU, we can 
observe two tendencies within the V4 countries. 
On one hand, they profit from the single market 
and from close relations with Germany. On the 
other hand, the importance of  these relations and a 
general dependence on exports make their econo-
mies vulnerable to external movements, as the 
financial crisis clearly demonstrated. Poland was the 
only EU country that has been able to consistently 
show economic growth during the financial crisis, 
thanks to its large and stable national economy.
2.3 German Fears and Migration: The Free 
Movement of Labor
The free movement of  labor was one of  the most 
controversial issues among EU member states 
after the 2004 enlargement. A central element of  
the EU single market, it became a considerable 
psychological factor for the German and Austrian 
public, which feared large numbers of  migrants. 
As a result, the German federal government under 
Gerhard Schröder negotiated the aforementioned 
exceptions and transitional regulations. Germany 
was able to force the EU Commission to address 
this matter, and transitional phases were put in 
place until 2009 and 2011 respectively. Poland was 
the last Visegrad country to agree to these tran-
sitional regulations. Unlike Germany, some coun-
tries, including Great Britain, Ireland, and Sweden, 
opened their labor markets immediately.35
Not only was the free movement of  labor an issue 
in the first years after the Cold War. So was general 
migration between Germany and the V4. Figure 2 
shows migration to Germany from the V4 coun-
tries. Migration patterns were by no means the 
same for all Visegrad countries. Incoming migra-
tion from Slovakia and the Czech Republic has 
remained fairly constant since 1993: between 6,000 
and 13,000 people annually. There was a rise in 
Hungarian migration to Germany starting in 2006; 
numbers have risen slightly since 2011 and 2012 
with the opening of  the German labor market.
Migration from Poland since 1991 has been more 
dynamic. After a drop in migration in 1992, the 
number of  immigrants remained relatively con-
stant until 2003. Between 2003 (around 105,000 
Polish migrants) and 2010 (around 126,000 Polish 
migrants), the number of  incoming Polish migrants 
spiked briefly at more than 160,000 people. In 
Figure 2: Migration to Germany by Country.
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2011 and 2012, the number of  Polish migrants 
was around 172,000 and 184,000 people respec-
tively. Opening the German labor market did not, 
however, lead to an extreme rise in migration from 
Poland.36
Figure 3 shows migration flows to and from Ger-
many in 2012. The Visegrad countries rank first 
(Poland), fourth (Hungary), and twentieth (Slova-
kia) among the countries from which people come 
to Germany. The Czech Republic is further down 
the list. Poland and Hungary are of  particular 
interest in this regard, especially since the current 
debate on migration in Germany (which is often 
more populist than it is realistic), focuses mostly on 
Romania and Bulgaria.37
Since the German labor market opened completely 
for workers from eight CEE countries in May 2011, 
the number of  new immigrants has been much 
lower than expected. (The German government 
estimated that there would be 150,000 immigrants 
from CEE countries in the first year, while the 
Cologne Institute for Economic Research predicted 
up to 800,000 labor migrants in the first two years.) 
But in May 2012, one year after the labor market 
opened, only 79,000 workers had emigrated from 
CEE countries.38 This shows that popular German 
fears were in fact ungrounded, although societal 
attitudes had been instrumental in shaping Ger-
many’s vehement demands for bundling transitional 
regulations into EU enlargement.
2.4 Germany Benefits from East Central 
European Leadership: The Case of 
European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Eastern Partnership Policies
Fifteen years ago German European policy fol-
lowed two parallel strategies: EU enlargement and 
deepening integration. These two areas have moved 
further and further apart in the past ten years. The 
success of  eastern enlargement in 2004 gave rise to 
many expectations in the countries neighboring the 
EU as well as in the new member states. Naturally, 
the enlargement meant that the EU’s circumfer-
ence became larger. The EU’s declared openness 
to admitting more countries caused uncertainty 
among the general public within the member states. 
Many member states expressed great reservations 
about this move into the unknown. A new fun-
damental conflict arose between EU enlargement 
Figure 3: Migration to Germany by Country.
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and EU neighborhood policy. Two main questions 
emerged: Which countries could realistically be 
offered the prospect of  accession? And what other 
instruments might the EU develop to forge closer 
relations to neighboring states without offering EU 
membership? The answer was to decouple integra-
tion and accession.
Further steps toward enlargement and other coop-
erative relationships were, after 2004, to be put on 
the back burner in favor of  privileged relationships 
under the aegis of  the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). This policy was introduced in May 
2004 immediately after enlargement. This new 
instrument had two main aims: to stabilize the 
EU’s neighbors on their path toward “European-
ization” and at the same time to concede the EU’s 
own limitations. The ENP therefore explicitly did 
not contain any promise of  future accession to 
the EU. This was meant to take off  the pressure 
of  enlargement options from EU neighborhood 
policy. However, the effectiveness of  this political 
instrument was also thus weakened considerably.
The complexity of  this project very soon became 
apparent. The periphery of  the EU is very large, 
and the countries on the EU’s borders are very 
diverse. Furthermore, the EU countries themselves 
have very different priorities. (For Germany, the 
V4 countries are the most important partners; for 
Sweden, the Eastern European countries in gen-
eral are the most important partners; for southern 
countries such as France or Italy, the EU’s Mediter-
ranean neighbors have the greatest relevance both 
as economic partners and in terms of  political 
stability.)
These divergent interests within the EU led to 
a division of  the ENP in 2007. During its EU 
Council Presidency in 2007, Germany pursued its 
Eastern European policy with an initiative entitled 
“ENP plus.” In response, France initiated the Union 
for the Mediterranean. This differentiation of  ENP 
aimed to dispel criticism of  a lack of  EU commit-
ment to its neighbors.
In 2008, even the member states themselves found 
the ENP was “mixed at best.”39 As a further step, 
bilateral treaties were negotiated with Eastern 
European countries wishing to accede to the EU 
that went beyond the partnership and cooperation 
treaties signed in the late 1990s. Firstly, the region-
alization of  ENP was to include more economic 
integration and, secondly, parts of  EU law, the 
acquis communautaire, was to be extended to the 
neighboring countries.
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) that finally evolved 
out of  the ENP reform process in 2008 was a 
compromise meant to achieve closer relationships 
with the EU without offering EU membership to 
the countries involved. What the ENP and later 
the EaP inherited from eastern enlargement were 
the principle of  conditionality and the logic of  an 
asymmetrical, paternalistic relationship (“take it or 
leave it”). What was new, however, was the effort 
made by Germany and the majority of  the EU 
member states to avoid finality at all costs. The 
Visegrad countries at first held a contrary position 
and saw further eastern enlargement as a mid-term 
option,40 but they bowed to the pressure of  the 
majority of  member states.41
The EU’s advance into the unknown, as was said, is 
an example of  how ENP, for fear of  overextending 
itself, concentrated rather shortsightedly on individual 
countries without focusing on the macro-region of  
Eastern Europe as a whole. The EaP encouraged the 
neighboring countries to see these partnerships as an 
either-or alternative between integration with Russia 
or with the EU. There was little to counter the uncer-
tainty of  many countries regarding future prospects 
for Europeanization, while Russia employed diverse 
means to undermine the EaP’s success.
Since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of  2004, and 
again after the introduction of  the EaP in 2008, ten-
sions between Russian and EaP partner countries 
have increased markedly. The EU’s eastern neighbors 
have not become more stable as a result of  the part-
nerships. Nor have there been economic advantages 
for these countries or for the EU member states. The 
current political crises in relations between Ukraine 
and Russia and between Russia and the EU are funda-
mentally putting the ENP into question.
With integration into the EU, the Visegrad group 
was able to develop new foreign policy aims. It, too, 
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looked toward its eastern neighbors, where a series 
of  “colored revolutions” were beginning to change 
the political landscape and open the path toward 
political reforms, particularly in Ukraine (2004) but 
also in Georgia (2003). These peaceful revolutions 
were, indeed, taking place in close geographical 
proximity to the EU.
Although Germany was among those countries that 
shaped EaP, the Visegrad countries in particular, 
and other central European countries as well, spoke 
out repeatedly for closer relationships with the 
rest of  Eastern Europe. Surprisingly, it was Poland 
(with Swedish support) that proposed the Eastern 
Partnership in the end. The reasons for this can be 
found in the differences between Germany’s East-
ern European policies and the attitudes present in 
the Visegrad countries. Germany – despite its tradi-
tional interest in a closer partnership with Eastern 
Europe – was against extending EU membership 
to more Eastern European countries, while the 
countries of  the V4 were committed to offering an 
EU perspective to their reform-oriented neighbors.
Poland’s greatest diplomatic success could well 
be the foundation of  the EaP. At any rate, this 
was preceded by a long learning process. Poland’s 
first EU initiatives failed quickly, as they were not 
well prepared or coordinated with other mem-
ber states.42 For example a Polish proposal for a 
kind of  “energy NATO,” in which member states 
would protect one another against blackouts and 
thus increase energy security, was mostly ignored 
in the EU system and quickly disappeared from 
the agenda.43 A second Polish proposal, a “square 
roots” system for weighting European Council 
votes, suffered a similar fate. With no support for 
his proposal, the Polish president of  the time, Lech 
Kaczyński, tried to force his hand with less than 
diplomatic means, such as threatening a veto at 
negotiations for the Lisbon Treaty.44 This uncon-
structive stance was exhibited again in 2006–07, 
when Poland put in a veto for beginning EU nego-
tiations with Russia because Russia had put a tem-
porary stop on Polish meat imports.45
These experiences in EU institutions initiated 
a change in Poland’s European policy. Donald 
Tusk’s liberal-conservative government banked on 
compromise and negotiations and consequently 
prepared the EaP with the greatest care. Poland 
needed to find supporters among the EU-15 
before bringing its proposal to the table. It sup-
ported France’s proposal for a Mediterranean 
Union in order to secure France’s loyalty. Polish 
leadership also realized the importance of  acting 
with the majority of  EU member states and thus 
abandoned discussions about EU membership for 
Ukraine. At the same time, Poland, holding the 
Visegrad presidency in 2008–09, saw that decision-
making processes within the V4 were difficult and 
also full of  compromises. For this reason, the V4 
format was of  only limited use to the initiative for 
an EaP. As Martin Dangerfield put it:
The mechanics of  drafting common V[isegrad] G[roup] 
strategy papers for the ENP tend to be rather protracted 
and beset by bureaucratic procedures and diplomatic 
issues which make for haggling over fine detail and 
insistence that national stances are reflected. The April 
2007 “Visegrad Group Contribution to the Discussion 
on the Strengthening of  the European Neighbourhood 
Policy” was arguably something of  a rather bland, “com-
promise” text containing mainly already well-rehearsed 
positions rather than any far-reaching novel solutions. 
Frustration with a slow process and competitive tendencies 
can mean partners may prefer to keep “big ideas” back 
from collective diplomacy and present them as triumphs 
of  national diplomacy. These difficulties also seem to 
indicate that the V[isegrad] G[roup] is not capable of  
fast collective detailed policy responses when windows of  
opportunity such as the Sarkozy Mediterranean Union 
initiative (which obviously helped pave the way for the 
E[uropean] P[artnerships]) present themselves.46
But the integration of  other CEE countries took 
form soon after. In November 2008, the V4 issued 
a common declaration with Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania containing concrete 
goals and a blueprint for the European Partner-
ship Policy. Germany consciously left the design 
of  the EaP to the new member states, but it did 
support the initiative in the Council of  the Euro-
pean Union. In 2009, the Czech Republic took over 
presidency of  the EU Council and gave the EaP 
decisive support. The Czech Republic managed to 
allot 600 million euros to the Eastern Partnership, 
almost double the original budget.47
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Although the Visegrad countries had promised to 
focus on EU neighborhood policy (declaring that 
the Visegrad group was “ready to assist countries 
aspiring for EU membership by sharing and trans-
mitting their knowledge and expertise”48), the V4 
countries were in fact only able to transfer limited 
resources. This was due to difficult decision-
making processes in the EU, a lack of  financial 
resources, and adversity from Russia. Competitive 
tendencies within the Visegrad group also took 
their toll. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
all claimed responsibility for furthering democracy 
and human rights but were not able to coordinate 
these issues among themselves.49
National interests and bilateral relationships with 
Russia also caused divisions in terms of  EU policy 
toward the EaP countries. The EU member states 
with close relationships with Russia “consider[ed] 
Russia to be too important a global player to let 
the EU lead in relations.”50 This attitude has shifted 
slightly in the past decade but remains relevant. 
The Visegrad group itself  was also often divided 
in terms of  each countrie’s own Eastern policies.51 
Numerous controversies kept the V4 from acting 
with more resolve and united resources – both 
internal and with the rest of  the EU.
Indeed, EU activity in Eastern Europe has been 
unable to meet its goal: stability and economic 
growth for the countries bordering the EU. From a 
German perspective, the development of  the ENP 
brought with it an interesting shift of  focus within 
the EU. After the accession of  countries who had 
a genuine interest in ENP (that is, interest that was 
much stronger than Germany’s), Germany was all 
too happy to leave this EU policy area to the new 
member states. These were able to set an ambi-
tious agenda for the Eastern European states – an 
agenda that Germany itself  would not have been 
able to achieve because of  certain conflicts of  
interest with Russia. Germany would also be inter-
ested in a deeper EU-Russia policy. These policy 
advancements brought Germany and the V4 closer 
together, but had little effect on their sphere of  
action.
2.5 German European Leadership in the 
EU’s Economic Crisis Policy and the V4
The limits of  the EU can be seen most clearly in 
an examination of  the issue of  a common cur-
rency. The European monetary union represents 
a “shared destiny,” as German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel once called it at the crisis summit of  2010. 
And in fact, the common currency was a strong 
force behind integration and behind new laws such 
as the fiscal package aimed at controlling national 
budget policies. The financial crisis thus accelerated 
the integration of  the eurozone countries. For the 
other EU member states, however, the speed of  
integration has been slower. Within the Visegrad 
countries, attitudes toward the euro mirror the 
notion of  “two-speed Europe” – a popular con-
cept that illustrates the differences in European 
integration. Slovakia introduced the euro in 2009, 
while Poland (although it has expressed interest in 
a common currency for many years) will not reach 
this goal in the short term. The Czech Republic 
only signaled openness to the euro in 2014. And 
Hungary’s government under Viktor Orbán’s lead-
ership rejects the introduction of  the euro any time 
in the near future.52
Germany has pursued various forms of  coopera-
tion to include non-eurozone members as well, for 
example the Euro Plus Pact of  2011. Poland is a 
member of  this pact, but the Czech Republic and 
Hungary are not.
A “two-speed Europe,” however, cannot function 
in all policy areas. In many areas, the EU requires 
the agreement of  all members to succeed. Fur-
thermore, issues such as transport, energy supply, 
and environmental protection do not end at the 
borders of  the member states. In this regard Ger-
many must also answer the question of  whether 
multilateralism can function on the European level. 
During the eurozone crisis, Germany and some-
times France took on strong leadership roles that 
were previously unprecedented in the European 
Community. The political scientist Gisela Müller-
Brandeck-Bocquet described Germany’s actions 
during the crisis as a necessity with far-reaching 
consequences: “A ‘directorium à la Merkozy’ may 
be useful in an emergency and can therefore be 
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tolerated, but it cannot be a blueprint for the future 
as it undermines the foundations of  the integration 
that drives the community and in the long term 
amounts to the disenfranchisement of  European 
partners.”53
Yet the German position is volatile. It oscillates 
between taking steps to preserve national control 
on the one hand and working on the other to 
enhance intergovernmental coordination within the 
eurozone, as evidenced by its current position on 
the banking union or the German-French paper of  
May 2013. At any rate, there is rhetorical commit-
ment to a genuine political union in the future. The 
perpetual balancing act gives the Visegrad countries 
some latitude to nudge Germany’s European policy 
toward the latter.54
2.6 Current Legitimacy: German Public 
Opinion of the Visegrad Countries
German attitudes toward the V4 countries changed 
somewhat after eastern enlargement. Of  the four 
countries, Poland is Germany’s largest and near-
est neighbor (measured by the length of  shared 
border). The burden of  history between the two 
countries is heavy. After German reunification, 
both countries had to rethink and redefine their 
new relationship. The Allensbach Institute con-
ducted a meta-analysis of  forty years of  public 
opinion surveys of  German-Polish relations. The 
analysis focused in particular on the dynamics of  
how Germans and Poles saw one another after 
the fall of  the Iron Curtain. While Germany was 
perceived by Poland as a source of  latent danger in 
the early 1990s – when worries about recognition 
of  the Oder-Neisse line were at the fore of  public 
discourse – this fear shifted to a positive image of  
Germans as a force behind European integration 
and in support of  Poland’s European future. In the 
early 1990s, Germany’s view of  Poland was mostly 
negative and linked to stereotypes of  petty crime, 
backwardness, and excessive religious fervor. Both 
sides stressed the burden of  history. For some time, 
feelings of  distance and estrangement had domi-
nated relations between these nations. But more 
than twenty years later, Germans and Poles have an 
increasingly nuanced image of  one another, as an 
Allensbach Institute survey states: “In recent years 
in particular, Germans again have a more positive 
opinion of  Poles.... Positive answers to the ques-
tion of  typical Polish characteristics have increased 
significantly.” 55
Other studies that looked at public opinion of  
bilateral relations between Germany and the V4 
countries have shown that there has been slow 
but steady improvement in German opinion since 
the early 1990s. On the whole, bilateral relations 
are deemed positive.56 While reservations were 
expressed in the past about the eastern enlarge-
ment of  the EU, in 2014, this question has long 
held little interest to the German population. And 
most Germans believe that security at the borders 
has increased since the Visegrad countries joined 
the EU.57 More and more Germans visit their 
neighbors to the East, which works positively to 
improve the image of  both countries. “Whoever 
knows their neighbors better also appreciates them 
more” – this is the conclusion of  a study that 
also looked at Germans’ opinions of  its eastern 
neighbors.58
2.7 European Security after the Ukrainian 
Revolution
Recent events in Ukrainian politics have in particular 
strengthened relations among Poland, Germany, and 
France and for a short time revitalized the Weimar 
Triangle. The foreign ministers of  all three countries 
were involved in negotiations between the former 
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and the 
opposition, and they have provided a cornerstone 
of  support for political change in Ukraine. This has 
not, however, been subsequently transferred into an 
increased importance of  the Visegrad group in the 
EU’s Eastern European policy.
This may partly be explained by the fact that the Pol-
ish government was going through a phase of  domes-
tic distrust and had to initiate a vote of  confidence 
after a scandal involving unauthorized interception of  
communications. Furthermore, in the aftermath of  
the Russian annexation of  the Crimean peninsula, the 
V4 countries pursued different strategic approaches. 
While Poland has asked for a permanent NATO pres-
ence on its soil, the Czech Republic does not for its 
part favor hosting NATO troops.59
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From the onset of  the crisis in Ukraine, the Ger-
man government failed to present a unified front. 
While the new German minister of  defense, Ursula 
von der Leyen, promised a more active German 
role and expressed solidarity with the Eastern EU 
member states, the foreign minister, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, put less emphasis on NATO and more 
on the OSCE and on keeping channels of  dialogue 
with Russia open.60 Consequently, joint V4-German 
strategies are not to be expected in the near future.
2.8 European Energy Security and the 
Visegrad Four
Without doubt, the issue of  energy security has 
been one of  the most controversial concerns 
between Germany and Poland in the past decade. 
Poland has been largely disappointed by the Ger-
man Nordstream Pipeline initiative, which was the 
result of  the political friendship between Gerhard 
Schröder and Vladimir Putin.61 Now, with gas 
increasingly becoming a tool of  Russian pressure 
on Ukraine, the framing conditions have changed 
substantially. As a consequence, Poland unilaterally 
began to motivate EU partners to create an energy 
union. Poland is extremely vulnerable in its energy 
relations. Prime Minister Tusk’s core idea is “for 
the EU to jointly negotiate gas contracts with Rus-
sia” and “for the European Commission to play a 
role in all future energy talks with Moscow.”62
In contrast to its earlier proposal of  an “Energy 
NATO,” Poland may be more successful with 
this initiative. On one hand, the German member 
of  the EU Commission who was responsible for 
energy issues until 2014, Günther Oettinger, sup-
ports the idea of  a unitary gas price for all EU 
member countries.63 On the other hand, it is more 
and more evident that contracts with Gazprom 
show obstacles of  compliance with EU law.
Consequently, the V4 group is following a two-
track approach with regard to energy security. The 
fact that the V4 recently asked the US to remove 
bureaucratic hurdles to exporting US shale gas to 
the region offers further proof  of  the seriousness 
of  the goal of  diversifying energy sources and cut-
ting dependency on Russia.64
Conclusions
The eastern enlargement of  2004 has proven to be 
a successful move on the part of  the EU. Although 
Germany actively supported fast-track accession of  
the CEE countries, it also supported its own financial 
interests within the EU. By actively shaping EU policy, 
the V4 countries strove to find their position within 
the EU system. Many common interests – but also 
differences of  opinion – between Germany and the 
V4 countries have been revealed during the complex 
EU decision-making procedures. The past ten years 
have shown that, for Germany, the Visegrad coalition 
plays a lesser role as a whole than do bilateral relation-
ships between Germany and each of  the four coun-
tries. The individual interests of  the Visegrad coun-
tries in different political questions simply diverge too 
greatly. But there are areas – in particular the Eastern 
Partnership – that effect Germany and the V4 coun-
tries equally and thus encourage closer cooperation. 
Germany also needs active dialogue with the Visegrad 
countries on questions of  climate and energy policy. 
No consensus will be possible on the EU level unless 
the national interests of  the individual Visegrad coun-
tries are taken into account.
The V4 countries are all aware that they benefitted 
from Germany’s leading role during the financial and 
economic crisis. This has improved the relationship 
between the V4 and Germany. As Michal Simecka 
put it: “One possible consequence of  changing atti-
tudes toward Germany could be the emergence of  
a durable coalition.” 65 Simecka assumes that this 
could even counterweight the role of  France, for 
although “Angela Merkel can always turn to France 
to deepen eurozone coordination, she lacks a com-
parably powerful partner with whom to walk in the 
direction of  inclusive federalization. This is a role that 
the Visegrad group – whose collective voting weight 
equals Germany and France combined – might aspire 
to. “Compared to France,” Simecka writes, “they 
could offer greater support for Germany’s economic 
vision, including more intrusive policing of  national 
fiscal prudence. In return, they should demand Ger-
man support for inclusiveness of  EU policies and 
commensurate empowerment of  community institu-
tions.”66 This could be regarded as a “grand bargain” 
between Germany and the V4 countries and would 
give a broader integration scenario a chance.
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As this paper has noted, however, consensus 
among the V4 is cost-intensive and often reached 
slowly, particularly after the changes in Hungary’s 
political landscape. A strategy of  more systemati-
cally opening cooperation with external partners 
and going beyond existing coalitions, as was 
demanded by Germany, has been suggested for the 
V4 as well. Proposals have been made to broaden 
cooperation, creating a “V4-plus” format with the 
Baltic States in particular.67 With regard to recent 
security issues, this could potentially become a for-
mat for security cooperation but may be less suited 
to the broad range of  domestic EU policy fields.
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